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Abstract— Existing techniques to ensure functional correctness 
and hardware trust during pre-silicon verification face severe 
limitations. In this work, we systematically leverage two key ideas: 
1) Symbolic Quick Error Detection (QED), a recent bug detection 
and localization technique using Bounded Model Checking 
(BMC); and 2) Symbolic starting states, to present a method that: 
i) Effectively detects both “difficult” logic bugs and Hardware 
Trojans, even with long activation sequences where traditional 
BMC techniques fail; and ii) Does not need skilled manual 
guidance for writing test-benches, writing design-specific 
assertions, or debugging spurious counter-examples. Using open-
source RISC-V cores, we demonstrate the following: 1. Quick (≤5 
minutes for an in-order scalar core and ≤2.5 hours for an out-of-
order superscalar core) detection of 100% of hundreds of logic bug 
and hardware Trojan scenarios from commercial chips and 
research literature, and 97.9% of “extremal” bugs (randomly-
generated bugs requiring ~100,000 activation instructions taken 
from random test programs). 2. Quick (~1 minute) detection of 
several previously unknown bugs in open-source RISC-V designs. 
 
Index Terms — Formal Verification, Symbolic Quick Error 
Detection, Hardware Trojans, Pre-silicon Verification, Bounded 
Model Checking. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
RE-SILICON verification requires major effort in a typical 
hardware design flow [1]. In this paper, we consider pre-
silicon verification of single processor cores, which are 
critical components of any System-on-Chip (SoC). Generally, 
pre-silicon verification mainly targets logic design errors (logic 
bugs). However, it is also crucial to detect Hardware Trojans 
(HTs) [2], which are unauthorized modification of a system that 
result in incorrect functionality and/or the exposure of sensitive 
data [3]. While previous research on HTs focused on attacks 
implemented during fabrication [4], there is growing concern 
about HTs being inserted in third-party Intellectual Property 
(IP) cores by malicious entities [5]. This makes HT detection 
during pre-silicon verification essential. 
Similar to logic bugs, HTs can affect functionality of a 
system. For example, an HT can cause an error that creates a 
change in the software-visible state of a system, defined by the 
state of software-visible registers and memory. The objective of 
HT detection is to detect these changes, which encompass many 
catastrophic attacks on processor cores [2]. 
Symbolic quick error detection (Symbolic QED or SQED) [6] 
is a new pre-silicon verification technique based on QED tests 
[7]. It uses bounded model checking (BMC) [8] for formal 
analysis of the design. QED tests generate short sequences of 
instructions that trigger logic bugs in a design. As such, SQED 
is an automatic bug detection and localization technique that is  
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extremely effective in practice. 
For example, SQED was recently applied to several industrial 
microcontroller cores used in commercial automotive products 
[9]. It was able to detect all recorded logic bugs in the designs, 
while enabling an 8-60X (depending on the design) reduction 
in verification effort compared to the standard industrial 
verification flow. 
Importantly, SQED does not target single-instruction bugs 
(i.e., bugs such that a single instruction on a specific set of 
inputs always produces an incorrect result). There are many 
other techniques that are highly effective at detecting such bugs, 
from both research literature [10] and in industry [9]. 
SQED analyzes a design symbolically, but it requires a 
concrete starting state (e.g., a state of the digital system that is 
given explicitly as a bit-vector of 0s and 1s). That means, to find 
bugs or HTs that require long activation sequences (i.e., many 
instructions are required to activate such bugs), Symbolic QED 
must rely on very deep BMC runs (i.e., runs that unroll the 
system far enough to include all the activation instructions). 
This can be very difficult for practical designs. In a related study 
[6], it was shown that BMC could unroll a large, multicore SoC 
up to around 30 clock cycles, within 24 hours of verification 
time. The following example [11] shows that SQED, while 
highly effective for logic bugs, can be insufficient for HTs. 
Motivating Example 1. Consider the following HT that is 
difficult to find using existing HT detection techniques: The HT 
changes opcodes of the next several decoded instructions if the 
processor has fetched a specific sequence of 256 instructions. 
This HT could inject an instruction sequence to bypass physical 
memory protection and run a privileged instruction. Such 
privilege escalation attacks [2] can be catastrophic.  
Because the HT requires a long sequence of instructions (and 
hence many clock cycles) for activation, SQED (like other 
BMC-based methods [12, 13]) fails to detect the HT unless the 
selected starting state for BMC quickly transitions to a state 
where the HT activates. Stumbling upon such a “close” state by 
starting at a concrete state (e.g., obtained from simulation or a 
power-on reset state) is highly unlikely to succeed since the HT 
can be designed with an arbitrary activation sequence that is not 
known a priori. 
To overcome this major challenge, we extend SQED so that 
it is now capable of starting from a symbolic (instead of 
concrete) starting state (i.e., we give the BMC tool the ability to 
choose an arbitrary starting state for each run).  
However, it is well-known that starting BMC from an 
unrestricted symbolic starting state risks generating spurious 
counterexamples (false positives). This occurs when the BMC 
tool incorrectly indicates that a bug or HT is present in a design, 
when there is actually no bug or HT. If the BMC tool selects a 
starting state that is not reachable from the set of all reset states 
of the system via a sequence of instructions, then a false positive 
might occur. For example, assume that each word in a memory 
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system is protected with a single even parity bit and assume that 
a BMC tool is asked to check the following property: for any 
sequence of reads and writes to the memory, the parity bits 
remain consistent with the data. If the starting state of the 
design is not constrained, then the BMC tool can initialize the 
memory to contain an all-zero word with a ‘1’ for the parity bit, 
issue an instruction that reads from this location, check the 
property, and report this false positive.  
Traditional methods rely on verification engineers to 
(manually) create constraints to rule out such false positives, 
which can be time-consuming for practical designs having 
many complex properties. This paper overcomes that challenge 
by: i) defining QED constraints: sufficient constraints (see 
Section III for details and Appendix B for proofs) to ensure 
false positives do not occur when using Symbolic QED with 
symbolic starting states; and ii) introducing QED recorders, 
which observe a small subset of internal signals within the 
processor to ensure the QED constraints are satisfied. QED 
recorders are used for pre-silicon verification only. They do not 
incur area overhead for the final design. 
Our work improves on a previous technique for SQED with 
symbolic initial states, called S2QED [14]. That approach 
differs from ours in the types of processors that can be verified, 
the types of logic bugs and HTs that can be detected, and the 
way symbolic initial states are implemented. We explain our 
advantages in Section II.C. 
Experimental results using our new method demonstrate: 
1. We automatically, correctly, and quickly (~1 minute) detect 
several previously unknown (real) logic bugs in open-source 
out-of-order (OoO) superscalar [15], and in-order scalar [16] 
RISC-V cores. The bugs found in [15] cannot be detected by 
[6] or [14]. 
2. We automatically, correctly, and quickly (within 25 seconds 
for in-order, 18 minutes for OoO) detect 100% of (117 in-
order, 120 OoO) simulated logic bugs, representing a wide 
variety of “difficult” logic bugs (Appendix A) from 
commercial designs. SQED with a concrete starting state 
detects only 33% (in-order) and 5% (OoO).   
3. We automatically, correctly, and quickly (within 5 minutes 
for an in-order core; 2 hours for an OoO superscalar core) 
detected 100% of (156 in-order, 195 OoO) simulated HTs, 
encompassing a wide variety of scenarios (Appendix A) from 
over 140 papers in the HT research literature. SQED with a 
concrete starting state detects 15% (in-order) and 9% (OoO).   
4. We automatically, correctly, and quickly (within 2.5 hours) 
detected 97.9% of an “extremal” bug family (randomly-
generated pre-condition-based bugs which require ~100,000 
activation instructions taken from random test programs) in 
an OoO superscalar core [15]. In contrast, SQED with a 
concrete starting state detected 0%, and [14] is not applicable. 
Important features of our new technique are: 
1. It is highly effective for detecting both logic bugs and HTs 
(despite long activation sequences) during pre-silicon 
verification of in-order and OoO superscalar cores, as 
demonstrated by our results. 
2. It does not require the verification engineer to manually craft 
design-specific assertions to detect logic bugs or HTs.  
3. No false positives occurred, as demonstrated by our results.  
4. It does not require a golden model or simulation data of the 
design-under-test for detection of logic bugs and/or HTs. 
5. Its effectiveness does not depend on the way HTs are 
designed, i.e., our method is HT-design agnostic. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
provides background on earlier QED works. Section III 
describes Symbolic QED with symbolic starting states. Results 
are presented in Section IV, followed by a survey of related 
work in Section V and conclusions in Section VI. 
Appendix A provides a list of logic bug and HT types used in 
the experiments of Section IV. Appendix B provides formal 
proofs of the sufficiency of QED constraints (introduced in 
Section III.B). Appendix C provides details on how QED 
constraints are specified to the BMC tool.  
II. BACKGROUND 
In the following, we present the basics and terminology of 
QED [7], SQED [6], and S2QED [14].  
A. QED and the EDDI-V Transformation 
Quick error detection (QED) is a testing technique that takes 
existing system validation tests (i.e., sequences of instructions) 
and automatically transforms them into a set of new tests using 
various QED transformations [7]. Among the various 
transformations that can be applied, Error Detection using 
Duplicated Instructions for Validation (EDDI-V) is the focus of 
our work (illustrated in Fig. 1). It targets bugs inside processor 
cores by checking the results of original instructions against the 
results of duplicate instructions.  
First, the software-visible register and memory space are 
divided into two halves, one for the original instructions and 
one for the duplicated instructions. Next, corresponding 
registers and memory locations for the original and duplicated 
instructions are initialized to hold the same values. This is 
called a QED-consistent system state. Then, for every load, 
store, arithmetic, logical, shift, or move instruction in the 
original test, EDDI-V creates a corresponding duplicate 
instruction that performs the same operation, but uses only 
registers and memory reserved for the duplicate ones. The 
duplicated instructions execute after the original instructions (in 
the same relative order), but may be interleaved. The EDDI-V 
transformation then inserts periodic check instructions that 
compare the results of the original instructions against those of 
the duplicated ones. A failing QED test occurs if after an equal 
number of original and duplicate instructions have committed, 
the system reaches a state that is not QED-consistent. The 
respective starting state and instruction sequence constitute a 
counterexample or QED-compatible bug trace. 
 
Fig. 1. Example of EDDI-V transformation. a) A sequence of original 
instructions; b) Transformed instructions executed by the processor. R17, R18, 
and R19 are the duplicate registers of R1, R2, and R3 respectively. 
B. Symbolic QED 
Symbolic QED [6] combines QED transformations with 
bounded model checking [8, 17] for pre-silicon verification of 
a design. SQED creates a BMC problem to check all possible 
EDDI-V tests within a bounded number of clock cycles for a 
failing one. It searches for counterexamples to properties of the 
form Ra == Ra′. Here, Ra is an original register, and Ra′ is the 
R17 = R17 + 5
R19 = R17 * R18
R1 = R1 + 5
R3 = R1 * R2
R1 = R1 + 5
R3 = R1 * R2
a) b)
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corresponding duplicate register in an EDDI-V test. To ensure 
that all possible counterexamples are QED-compatible: 1. 
Original instructions must be valid instructions from the 
instruction set architecture (ISA) of the design; 2. The 
instruction sequence must be an EDDI-V test. 
A QED module (a small hardware module that is only used 
during pre-silicon verification and does not incur area overhead 
for the final design) automatically transforms a sequence of 
original instructions into a QED-compatible sequence (e.g., as 
in Fig. 1). The QED module only requires that the input 
sequence is made up of valid instructions that read or write to 
only the original registers and memory (conditions that can be 
specified directly to the BMC tool). After execution, a signal is 
asserted (denoted below as QED()*+,). All original and 
corresponding duplicate registers should contain the same 
values in a bug-free situation, i.e., the BMC tool checks that ↑ .QED()*+,/ ⇒ 1 Ra == Ra′*∈{4,…,N}  
where 2N is the number of registers defined by the ISA. Here 
(for a ∈ {1,… , N}), Ra and Ra′ correspond to original and 
duplicate registers.	↑ .QED()*+,/ is true on any clock edge 
where QED()*+, transitions from low to high.  
The starting state for the BMC run must also be a QED-
consistent state, in which the value stored in each original 
register or memory location matches the corresponding 
duplicate register or memory location. This is to prevent 
spurious counterexamples from being generated. One way to 
obtain such a state is to run an EDDI-V test in simulation and 
stop immediately after QED checks have compared all register 
and memory values. 
Symbolic QED can also detect HTs, if it finds an EDDI-V 
test for which the HT affects original registers and duplicate 
registers differently. For example, assume an HT is inserted 
(unknown to the designer) that activates when a 128-bit counter 
reaches its maximum value. Assume the HT changes an in-
flight instruction to a NOP when it activates (cf., activation 
criteria A.2.a.2 (𝑋4 = 128) of Appendix A and effect A.2.b.1 
of Appendix A). If the counter is initialized to the value 24@A −1, and the register file is initialized in a QED-consistent state, 
SQED can detect the HT using the EDDI-V test {ADDI R1, R1, 
2; ADDI R17, R17, 2; CHECK R1==R17}. However, as the 
existence of the counter is unknown, it is impossible to pick the 
proper concrete starting state a priori. Instead, our approach to 
SQED with symbolic starting states (detailed in Section III) 
automatically detects this HT by starting the design at a state 
where {Counter = 24@A − 1;	R1=0; R17=0} and running the 
above EDDI-V test. 
C. S2QED 
S2QED [14] is another technique for pre-silicon verification 
of processor cores which extends SQED by incorporating 
symbolic initial states. Like the approach in this paper, S2QED 
focuses only on EDDI-V tests. S2QED instantiates two copies 
of the CPU-under-test, called CPU-1 and CPU-2. An arbitrary 
bijective mapping is then determined between the general-
purpose registers and memory locations of the two CPU 
instances. A new notion of “QED-consistency” (which we refer 
to as S2QED-consistency) is achieved by any state where all 
values in the general- and special-purpose registers and 
memory locations of CPU-1 match the values in the mapped 
registers and memory locations of CPU-2. 
At the start of verification, both CPUs are initialized to a 
S2QED-consistent state. CPU-1 fetches an instruction called the 
instruction under verification (IUV) while CPU-2 fetches the 
corresponding S2QED duplicate instruction (i.e., the same 
instruction but with operand specifiers replaced by 
corresponding register or memory locations for CPU-2). In the 
following clock cycles, CPU-1 is constrained to fetch NOPs 
until the IUV commits, while CPU-2 can fetch arbitrary valid 
instructions (treated as symbolic instructions by the BMC tool). 
S2QED then attempts to prove that directly after the IUV and its 
S2QED duplicate commit, the CPUs remain S2QED-consistent. 
Thus, S2QED is can prove that the model of the processor 
design is free of bugs of a specific type. 
However, S2QED [14] is unable to detect a (large) class of 
logic bugs and HTs that SQED [6] and the new method in this 
paper are able to detect: 
Motivating Example 2. When all registers in the general-
purpose register file contain the same value, a logic bug or HT 
attack is triggered. 
These bugs and HTs escape S2QED, because they affect the 
original and duplicate CPU equivalently. In contrast, our new 
approach detects the bugs and HTs by creating scenarios where 
mismatches between original and duplicate instructions occur. 
To count how many distinct logic bugs and HTs could exist 
from the above class, the benchmark core [18] used in [14] has 
16 distinct 32-bit general-purpose registers. There are at least 2K@ distinct logic bug activation types (Appendix A; Table 
A.1.a.3 with R=16) and at least 2K@ distinct HT activation 
scenarios (Appendix A; Table A.2.a.3 with M2=16) which fall 
under Motivating Example 2 that are considered in our 
experiments in Section IV. Multiplying this by at least 3 distinct 
logic bug effects (Appendix A; Table A.1.b.1-3) and at least 4 
distinct HT effects (Appendix A; Table A.2.b.1-4), there are at 
least 12 billion distinct logic bugs and at least 17 billion distinct 
HTs that would not be caught by S2QED, but will be caught by 
our new technique. 
Our approach also differs from S2QED in that it is especially 
suited for a broader class of processor designs, including OoO 
superscalar processors. This capability is enabled by the QED 
constraints we define (Section III.B), together with QED 
recorders (Section III.C) and a new QED module (Section 
III.C). In contrast to our approach, S2QED is applicable to 
processors with Out-of-Order writeback. This is possible due to 
additional constraints that restrict the state of the instruction 
pipeline. Such constraints can also be integrated in our 
framework. Further, S2QED does not require a QED module or 
QED recorders. However, it requires duplication of the CPU in 
the model of the design-under-test (only during pre-silicon 
verification), whereas our approach requires only a single CPU. 
III. EXTENDING SQED WITH SYMBOLIC STARTING STATES 
We now present our new extension of SQED [6] with 
symbolic starting states. In Section III.A, we describe the 
design of a new, improved QED module that is integrated in the 
model of the design-under-test during pre-silicon verification. 
These improvements enable the detection of real logic bugs that 
[6] fails to detect (see Section IV.A). Section III.B introduces a 
set of QED-constraints on the symbolic starting state that allow 
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us to avoid false positives. The sufficiency of these constraints 
is proven in Appendix B. To implement the QED-constraints, 
we introduce QED-recorders in Section III.C. These are 
additional hardware modules (used only during pre-silicon 
verification) that record a small subset of internal logic values 
of the processor core to ensure that the QED-constraints are 
satisfied when a QED test begins. Fig. 2 contrasts Symbolic 
QED without/with symbolic starting states. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Symbolic QED without/with symbolic starting states. a) SQED inputs 
and steps with concrete starting state; b) SQED inputs and steps with symbolic 
starting state.  
A.  New QED Module for Single Processor Cores 
Pseudocode for the new QED module is given in Fig. 3a. 
Inputs are: 1) enable: disables the QED module if false; 2) 
next_instruction: next instruction to be executed; 3) fetch_next: 
true when the core is ready to receive an instruction, i.e., the 
fetch stage is not stalled; 4) original: tells the core to execute an 
original (if true) or duplicate (if false) instruction. Outputs are: 
1) instruction_valid: indicates whether the output instruction is 
valid; and 2) instruction_out: instruction to be executed. The 
QED module has internal variables: 1) queue: a queue data 
structure that stores previous original instructions that have not 
yet been executed in the duplicate subsequence; 2) 
head_instruction: the previous head of the queue; 3) 
insert_valid: true when an instruction is loaded into the queue; 
4) delete_valid: true when the QED module can execute a 
duplicate instruction; 5) duplicate_instruction: next instruction 
in duplicate subsequence to execute (when original is false). 
QED checks occur when the qed_ready signal of the QED 
module is true. Pseudocode for determining this signal is given 
in Fig. 3b. To avoid trivial false positives, QED checks occur 
when an equal number of commits (writes) have been made to 
original registers and duplicate registers. This is accomplished 
by keeping track of the number of original and duplicate 
commits to the register set, as shown in Fig. 3b. For simplicity, 
in Fig. 3b, we assume that at most one instruction commits per 
cycle. For superscalar processors that can commit multiple 
instructions in the same cycle, we track all corresponding pairs 
of write_valid (tells whether the input data is valid) and 
write_address (the address for the data to be written) signals, 
keep a separate is_original signal (identifies if a write address 
corresponds to an original or duplicate location) for each 
instruction, and allow the original and duplicate counters to be 
incremented multiple times if needed. 
The old QED module of [6] requires that all original 
instructions complete, a waiting period occurs for the pipeline 
to be flushed, and duplicate instructions execute, before the 
qed_ready signal is asserted. In constrast, this new QED module 
allows arbitrary interleaving of the original and duplicate 
instruction subsequences, without requiring a waiting period. 
This additional timing diversity is made possible by giving the 
BMC tool control over the original input of Fig. 3a. The QED-
ready logic (Fig. 3b) can be further enhanced as follows: 
1.The current QED-ready logic is only applicable to single 
processor cores, since a multi-core system would require 
considering the original and duplicate commits across all 
cores. This can be challenging in situations where multiple 
cores operate with a shared address space. For simplicity, we 
do not consider this situation in this paper. 
2.For some processors, e.g., superscalar processors with 
explicit register renaming (MIPS 10000 [19] and ARM’s 
Cortex-A15 [20]), the designation of original or duplicate 
instruction cannot be made solely on physical address (unlike 
in Fig. 3b). This issue can be corrected by including the 
current state of the register mapping table as an input to the 
function is_write_to_original_space.  Each time a QED 
check happens, the same mapping table must be used to map 
logical to physical addresses before comparing original and 
duplicate values. The RISC-V cores used in our experimental 
evaluation (see Section IV), however, do not have this issue. 
 
    
 
 
Fig. 3. Pseudocode for a) New QED module; b) QED-ready enable logic. 
B.  QED Constraints 
We first define some terminology used in the constraint 
definitions: i) Symbolic In-Flight (SIF) “instructions”: symbols 
(i.e., state bits), part of the symbolic starting state (which will 
be assigned 0s and 1s by the BMC tool), corresponding to 
(microarchitectural) flip-flops within the pipeline that hold 
instructions during normal operation of the core1; ii) TC: the 
point in time when all SIF instructions have committed (i.e., 
Design Phase
Formal Analysis
Core Design QED Module 
Connect Modules 
For Verification
Run 
SQED
QED Test
Failure
Bug Found
Concrete 
Start
State
a)
Connect Modules For 
Verification
SQED
w/ Symbolic Start
QED Test
Failure
Bug Found
QED 
Constraints
b)
Core Design QED Module QED Recorders 
INPUT: enable, next_instruction, fetch_next, original 
OUTPUT: instruction_out, instruction_valid 
// initialization 
queue ¬ 0;  head_instruction ¬ 0; 
// end initialization 
insert_valid  ¬ fetch_next & original & ~queue.is_full(); 
delete_valid ¬ fetch_next & ~original & ~queue.is_empty(); 
instruction_valid ¬ insert_valid | delete_valid; 
if insert_valid then 
  queue.push(next_instruction);   // store next instruction in queue 
else if delete_valid then 
  head_inst ¬ queue.pop();        // remove head instruction 
end if 
duplicate_instruction¬create_duplicated_version(head_inst); 
instruction_out ¬ (enable & ~original) ?  
  duplicate_instruction : next_instruction; 
a) 
INPUT: write_valid, write_address 
OUTPUT: qed_ready 
// initialization  
qed_ready ¬ false; count_original ¬ 0; count_duplicate ¬ 0; 
// end initialization 
is_original ( is_write_to_original_space(write_address); 
if write_valid then 
  if is_original then 
    count_original++;    // increment num. orig. insts. committed 
  else 
    count_duplicate++; // increment num. dup. insts. committed 
  end if 
end if 
qed_ready ¬ (count_original == count_duplicate) ? true : false; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) 
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written to the architectural state). This is determined by the 
BMC tool. iii) Symbolic QED instructions: symbols which 
represent the instructions that form the bug trace (which is part 
of the counterexample, along with the starting state that BMC 
assigns) generated by the BMC tool after TC; and iv) Symbolic 
QED operand data: symbols representing the operand2 data of 
dispatched Symbolic QED instructions (dispatched before TC). 
Fig. 4 illustrates these definitions for a 3-stage in-order 
pipeline. When the formal analysis begins, there are up to 3 SIF 
instructions in the pipeline, and all commit by time TC. The first 
Symbolic QED instruction (R1=R1+5 in Cycle 1 of Fig. 4) is 
fetched into the pipeline, and its Symbolic QED operand data is 
available after the Dispatch stage.  
Now, the QED constraints are stated as follows (Appendix C 
further details how each constraint is enforced): 
Constraint C-1. At TC, all SIF instructions have committed 
(i.e., no SIF instruction can write to the architectural state after TM), while all Symbolic QED instructions commit after TC.  
Constraint C-2. At TC, the architectural state (program-
visible registers and memory) is QED-consistent (Section II.B), 
and nothing but Symbolic QED instructions can write to 
architectural state after TC (e.g., test modes such as scan that 
bypass instructions to write to architectural state are disabled).  
Constraint C-3. All the operand data for each Symbolic 
QED instruction 𝐼, must satisfy one of the following properties:  
i) if operand data is available (i.e., 𝐼 has already read data for 
this operand) at TC then it matches the corresponding register 
or memory location (i.e., source operand location) data at TC. 
ii)3 if operand data is not available at TC, then 𝐼 is waiting for 
the result of an earlier Symbolic QED instruction for this 
operand data. 
 
Fig. 4. Timing diagram for a three-stage in-order pipeline satisfying all QED 
constraints. SIF instructions commit by time TC, before all SQED instructions.  
The QED constraints form a sufficient condition to ensure no 
false positives, given that bug-free designs satisfy two 
assumptions after TC: 
Assumption-1. If a Symbolic QED instruction is executed twice 
on the same data, it results in the same value being stored to 
architectural state, e.g., Rx=1+2; and Ry=1+2 always result 
in the same value stored to both registers Rx, and Ry. Note: 
there is no assumption that the stored value is ‘3’. 
Assumption-2. If a Symbolic QED instruction has a read-after-
write dependency with earlier instructions, it uses the most 
recent value of the data in its computation. For example, in 
the program {R1=5; R2=R1+2; R3=R2-2}, if the first 
instruction stored ‘5’ to architectural-state, the second 
instruction will use value ‘5’ for R1. 
We can now state the main theorem of the paper. Formal 
definitions and full proofs are deferred to Appendix B. 
 
Theorem 1. Let Constraints C-1, C-2, and C-3 be satisfied by a 
starting state of a processor core. Let Assumptions-1 and -2 hold 
after TC for any bug-free design of the core. If any EDDI-V test 
fails, the failure must be caused by a bug in the design. 
 
Proof: See Appendix B.                                                          ∎ 
 
PROOF OUTLINE: We first define notation for a sequence of 
Symbolic QED instructions in a QED-compatible bug trace. 
Next, we isolate the first pair of Symbolic QED instructions 
which cause an EDDI-V test failure. We decompose the 
execution of these two instructions into a union of six mutually 
disjoint cases. For each case, we give a proof by contradiction 
(of one or more Assumptions) that there must be a bug in the 
design, thus concluding the proof.                              ∎ 
 
We also observed empirically (see Section IV), that at least 
one assumption was violated in each BMC bug trace.  
C.  Symbolic QED Recorders 
QED recorders copy a small number of internal signals in a 
design (to track TC and Symbolic QED operands) so that we can 
specify the QED constraints to the BMC tool. For ease of 
understanding, we take an in-order core with single instruction 
fetch and 5-stage pipeline as a running example in Section III.C, 
but we explain how the technique is generalized to other cores. 
In Section IV, we present results for both in-order (scalar) and 
OoO (superscalar) cores. 
Recorder for TC. As TC depends on the starting state chosen 
by the BMC tool, it cannot be statically determined before the 
formal analysis begins. A recorder is used to give this 
information to the BMC tool dynamically. For an in-order core, 
TC can be determined by simply tracking the progress of the 
first Symbolic QED instruction (the first symbolic instruction 
the BMC tool creates as part of the bug trace) until it reaches 
the commit stage (write-back stage) of the pipeline. At this 
time, all SIF instructions must have committed, as the pipeline 
is occupied by Symbolic QED instructions. 
Specifics of the TC recorder for a 5-stage, single-fetch, in-
order pipeline is given in Fig. 5. Inputs are ready signals for all 
stages that precede the commit stage (e.g., fetch_ready is true 
when the fetch stage is ready to receive an instruction). The 
output SIF_complete is true when the first Symbolic QED 
instruction goes through all pipeline stages and reaches the 
commit stage. The output mode keeps track of progress made 
so far by the Symbolic QED instruction (we later make use of 
this output in the Symbolic QED operand recorder). This TC 
recorder for a 5-stage pipeline can be easily modified to support 
in-order pipelines with a different number of stages. 
For an OoO core, the TC recorder is even simpler, and utilizes 
the reorder buffer (ROB). The idea is to mark the entry allocated 
in the ROB for the first Symbolic QED instruction. After this, 
SIF_complete is assigned true when the ROB head pointer 
reaches the marked instruction. For cores with no ROB, but 
OoO commit (e.g., [18]), an additional constraint is required 
(see Section II.C).  
Symbolic QED operand recorder. Like TC, the Symbolic 
QED operands also depend on the starting state. The Symbolic 
Fetch
Time
SIF_Inst_1Initialization
Dispatch/EX Commit
Cycle 1
Cycle 2
Pipeline stages
Cycle 3 (!")
SIF complete,
QED-consistent
Register State
Cycle 4
SIF_Inst_2 R1 = 3, R17 = 2
R1 = 2, R17 = 2R1=R1+5
SIF_Inst_3
SIF_Inst_2SIF_Inst_3
R1 = 2, R17 = 2SIF_Inst_3R1=2+5
R1=7 R1 = 2, R17 = 2
R17=2+5
R1=R1-2
R1 = 7, R17 = 2
R1=7-2
…
R17=R17+5
R1=5R17=R17-2
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QED operand recorder stores information for both register and 
memory operands. Specifics of the Symbolic QED operand 
recorder for a 5-stage, single-fetch, in-order pipeline is given in 
Fig. 6. Inputs are: 1) *_addr, which gives register/memory 
address of the corresponding operand; 2) *_data, which gives 
operand data; 3) *_valid, which is true when *_addr is valid 
and *_data is valid; 4) mode, which gives the state of the TC 
recorder (Fig. 5). Output *_buffer stores all Symbolic QED 
operands and their values (buffer depth is determined by the 
maximum number of instructions in-flight at a given time).  
 
Fig. 5. Pseudocode for TC recorder. 
 
Fig. 6. Pseudocode for Symbolic QED operand recorder. 
We only store the information for Symbolic QED instruction 
operands in buffers, i.e., we do not store operand information 
of any SIF instruction. This is enforced by checking the TC 
recorder state, i.e., mode (we do not add entries to *_buffer until 
all SIF instructions pass through the dispatch stage). In Fig. 6, 
we assume that each instruction requires at most two register 
values and one memory value, but the idea is easily extended to 
more source operands. 
                                               
1The formal tool is free to choose any values for symbols (state bits) associated with SIF 
instructions, including those that do not constitute a valid instruction. 
2Operands may come from either registers or memory locations. For register (memory) 
operands, the dispatch stage is the register read (memory read) stage. 
For an OoO core, Fig. 6 is extended to include Symbolic 
QED operands that are waiting on results of earlier Symbolic 
QED instructions. For each waiting operand, we also store the 
instruction tag (ROB entry number) of the instruction it is 
waiting for. This information is used to specify Constraint C-3 
for an OoO core (see Appendix C). 
IV. RESULTS 
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our new 
technique on two open-source RISC-V processor cores: i) 
Vscale [16], an in-order core targeting embedded applications; 
and ii) RIDECORE [15], an OoO superscalar core (2-way 
pipeline, 64 maximum instructions in-flight, 2 ALUs, 1 
multiplier, 1 load/store unit) for high performance applications. 
For BMC, we used the Questa Formal tool (version 10.5c) from 
Mentor Graphics on an AMD Opteron 6438 with 128 GB of 
RAM. For each core, we instrumented the new QED module 
(Section III.A), QED constraints (Section III.B), and QED 
recorders (Section III.C). 
A.  Previously Unknown Bugs 
We first found three previously unknown logic bugs in the 
multiplier reservation station (RS-m) of the RIDECORE design 
(all three confirmed by RIDECORE designers [21], see Table 
1). These bugs only activate when back-to-back multiply 
instructions execute on successive clock cycles. They were 
detected due to the new QED module of this paper (see Section 
III.A). This design improves upon [6] by allowing arbitrary 
interleaving of original and duplicate instruction subsequences 
in EDDI-V tests (see Section II.A), without requiring a waiting 
period between them. The QED module of [6] cannot detect 
these bugs, and S2QED [14] is not applicable to RIDECORE.  
Table 1. New bugs in RIDECORE. Symbolic QED runtimes. 
Bug  
Activation 
Bug  
Effect 
Runtime 
(power-on 
reset starting 
state) 
Runtime  
(symbolic 
starting 
state) 
All but one (buggy 
entry) RS-m 
entries occupied; 
MULH41 
instruction 
assigned to 
vacant entry. 
First 
source 
operand 
of MULH 
instruction 
corrupted. 
63 sec. 25 min. 
Same as above. Second 
source 
operand 
of MULH 
instruction 
corrupted. 
69 sec. 61 min. 
Same as above, 
but MULHU52 
instr. assigned to 
vacant entry. 
Result of 
MULHU 
instruction 
corrupted. 
93 sec. 64 min. 
 
We also found two bugs in Vscale (Table 2), by running 
Symbolic QED with the new QED module, starting at a 
concrete, power-on reset state in less than 40 seconds (also 
3This condition is required for OoO cores, where there is a possibility that the Symbolic 
QED operand may wait on a SIF instruction instead of a Symbolic QED instruction. 
4MULH is a signed multiply instruction selecting the upper half of the multiplier result. 
5MULHU is an unsigned multiply, selecting the upper half bits of the multiplier result. 
6 This program comes packaged with RIDECORE by the designers as a part of a testbench. 
It is used only for “extremal” bug creation – not for verification or bug detection.  
INPUT: fetch_ready, dispatch_ready, exec_ready, mem_ready 
OUTPUT: SIF_complete, mode 
// initialization 
mode ¬ S0;     SIF_complete ¬ false;  
// end initialization 
if (mode == S0) && (fetch_ready) then 
  mode ¬ S1;   SIF_complete ¬ false;  //inst passes fetch stage 
end if 
if (mode == S1) && (dispatch_ready) then 
  mode ¬ S2;   SIF_complete ¬ false;  //inst passes decode stage 
end if 
if (mode == S2) && (exec_ready) then 
  mode ¬ S3;   SIF_complete ¬ false;  //inst passes execute stage 
end if 
if (mode == S3) && (mem_ready) then 
  mode ¬ S4;   SIF_complete ¬ true;  //inst passes mem stage 
end if 
INPUT:  src1_addr, src1_data, src1_valid, src2_addr, src2_data, 
src2_valid, mem_addr, mem_data, mem_valid, mode 
OUTPUT: src1_buffer, src2_buffer, mem_buffer 
// initialization 
src1_buffer ¬ empty_buffer;  src2_buffer ¬ empty_buffer;  
mem_buffer ¬ empty_buffer; 
// end initialization 
if (mode != S0) && (mode != S1) && (src1_valid || src2_valid) 
then 
  if (src1_valid) then 
    src1_buffer.add_entry(src1_addr, src1_data); 
  end if 
  if (src2_valid) then 
    src2_buffer.add_entry(src2_addr, src2_data); 
  end if 
end if 
if ((mode == S3) || (mode == S4)) && (mem_valid) then 
  mem_buffer.add_entry(mem_addr, mem_data); 
end if 
 
 
7 
confirmed by designers). These bugs are due to errors in the 
Vscale implementation of the RISC-V privileged ISA [22], 
within specific Control Status Registers (CSRs). Importantly, 
Vscale does not implement shadows for CSRs. To circumvent 
this, the EDDI-V transformation (Section II.A) duplicates 
instructions using a scratchpad memory for each CSR. 
  
Table 2. Confirmed bugs in VSCALE. Runtimes are for Symbolic 
QED with concrete, power-on reset starting state 
Bug Activation Bug Effect Runtime 
 ‘1’ is written to specific bit 
positions in the machine-
interrupt CSR MIP. 
MTIMECMP 
register corrupted; 
Causes repeated 
interrupts. 
2 sec. 
Any value with lower two 
bits ‘01’ or ‘10’ written to 
the machine-level CSR 
MSTATUS. 
Design enters 
unspecified 
privilege level; 
MEPC corrupted;  
33 sec. 
B.  “Difficult” Logic Bugs and HT Scenarios 
We simulated 120 (117) logic bug types using RIDECORE 
(Vscale). These are “longer” (up to 256 consecutive activation 
instructions) versions of “difficult” logic bugs (see Appendix 
A; Table A.1.a-b) that occurred in various commercial designs 
[6]. We also simulated 195 (156) difficult HT scenarios (see 
Appendix A; Table A.2.a-c) which encompasses over 140 
papers in research literature (see Section V.C) using 
RIDECORE (V-scale). Results are in Table 3. 
Table 3. “Long” logic bugs and HTs. We report [min, avg., max]. 
  “Long” Bugs HTs 
Vs
ca
le
 
Total count injected 117 156 
Symbolic QED with symbolic starting state 
Coverage 100% 100% 
Bug trace length (instructions) [2, 2, 3] [2, 2, 3] 
Bug trace length (clock cycles) [5, 5, 6] [5, 5, 6] 
BMC runtime (seconds) [2, 4, 25] [2, 11, 313] 
Symbolic QED with concrete starting state 
Coverage 33% 15.3% 
RI
DE
CO
RE
 
Total count injected 120 195 
Symbolic QED with symbolic starting state 
Coverage  100% 100% 
Bug trace length (instructions) [4, 4, 4] [4, 4, 4] 
Bug trace length (clock cycles) [8, 8, 8] [8, 8, 8] 
BMC runtime (minutes) [7, 13, 18] [7, 20, 121] 
Symbolic QED with concrete starting state 
Coverage 5% 8.7% 
Observation 1: SQED with symbolic starting states correctly 
and automatically found all “long” logic bugs, in less than 30 
mins, with no false positives. It found bugs that traditional 
BMC methods fail to detect (including SQED). SQED with 
concrete starting state detected only 5% of these bugs in 
RIDECORE and 33% of these bugs in Vscale. 
Observation 2: SQED with symbolic starting states correctly 
and automatically found all injected HTs (including those 
designed to evade state-of-the-art HT detection techniques; see 
Section V and Appendix A), in less than 2.5 hours, without 
requiring design-specific assertions or debug of false positives. 
SQED with a concrete starting state detected only 9% of these 
HTs in RIDECORE and 15% of these HTs in Vscale. 
C.  “Extremal” Bugs 
To further demonstrate the robustness of our presented 
technique, we inject “extremal” bugs (only triggered when the 
design reaches a very specific set of states) into RIDECORE. 
We focused on RIDECORE for this experiment since it is OoO, 
superscalar, and more complex than Vscale. Also, S2QED [14] 
is not applicable to RIDECORE. Our extremal bug injection 
methodology is as follows: i) Run Matrix Multiply6 (1M cycles) 
on the design in simulation, and stop the simulation at a random 
clock cycle; ii) Run a uniform random sequence of 100 ALU or 
Load/Store instructions; iii) Select a uniformly random subset 
of flip-flips from the set of all flip-flops in the design and record 
their logic values; and iv) Generate a bug (effect A.1.b.3 of 
Appendix A), injected into the design. This bug activates when 
the design reaches a state where all the selected flip-flops (step 
iii) have a specific set of values recorded (step iii).  
We present our results in Table 4. For generating such 
extremal bugs, we randomly chose 180 time points (step i), 
ranging from 26,026 to 988,159 clock cycles elapsed from 
program start. For each time point, we ran a random 100-
instruction sequence (step ii), and then randomly selected 10 
different subsets of 128 flip-flops (step iii), resulting in 1,800 
total extremal bug count. Using the Questa Formal tool (version 
10.5c) from Mentor Graphics on 6 (in parallel) AMD Opteron 
6438 machines with 128 GB of RAM, we were able to run 
roughly 60 experiments to completion each day. We stopped at 
1,800 experiments, after roughly 1 month of runtime. 
Whereas Symbolic QED with concrete starting state detected 
0% of these 1,800 “extremal” bugs, Symbolic QED with 
symbolic starting state was able to detect 1,763 of these 1,800 
bugs. For the remaining cases, the BMC tool timed out after 24 
hours. A closer inspection reveals that the BMC tool was not 
able to unroll the design beyond 7 clock cycles (8 clock cycles 
are needed to observe these bugs). In future work, we plan to 
investigate ways to improve BMC tools to address such issues 
(following approaches such as [23, 24]).  
Table 4. “Extremal” logic bugs in RIDECORE. 
We report [min, avg., max]. 
Observation 3: Our new Symbolic QED with symbolic 
starting states correctly and automatically found 97.9% of the 
“extremal” logic bugs and generated a bug trace in less than 2.5 
hours. In contrast, Symbolic QED with concrete starting state 
detected 0% of the “extremal” bugs. 
V. RELATED WORK 
In this section, we compare and contrast existing pre-silicon 
verification techniques for logic bug detection (Section V.A) 
and HT detection (Section V.B) with the method of this paper. 
In Section V.C, we provide a survey of HT attacks implemented 
in research literature. We show that each attack fits in one of 
the categories (Appendix A; Tables A.2.a-b) used in our HT 
experiments (see Section IV.B) 
A.  Existing Pre-silicon Verification Methods for Logic Bugs 
Existing formal verification techniques employing BMC [6, 
10] have issues in detecting logic bugs that require a long 
Total count injected 1,800 
Symbolic QED with symbolic starting state 
Coverage 97.9% 
Bug trace length (instructions) [4, 4, 4] 
Bug trace length (clock cycles) [8, 8, 8] 
BMC runtime (minutes) [8, 33, 149] 
Symbolic QED with concrete starting state 
Coverage 0% 
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activation sequence. Other works for processor cores use 
theorem proving [25], or try to learn invariants of the design 
[26] to be used as constraints, but these techniques tend to be 
ad-hoc and require a high level of manual effort. In seminal 
work [27] and extensions [28], models of processors were 
verified based on abstractions by uninterpreted functions with 
equality. That approach in general requires to provide invariants 
to avoid false positives. E-QED [29] is a BMC-based technique 
for electrical bug localization in post-silicon validation. Apart 
from that, it is substantially different from our technique, e.g., 
as it does not rely on the duplication of instructions. 
False positives are a major challenge for traditional BMC. 
However, the same QED constraints (Section III.B) used by our 
approach may not prevent false positives for general property 
checking using BMC. The following example illustrates this 
point. Let a processor core start at a state where the Exception 
Program Counter (EPC) (i.e., the register storing the return 
address for an exception) is misaligned (i.e., not aligned with 
any word in the instruction cache), the current PC is within an 
exception handling routine, and there are only NOP instructions 
in the pipeline. This is an unreachable state for processors with 
strict alignment rules (e.g., MIPS [19]). It is reasonable to check 
the property that the EPC is aligned, since returning to a 
misaligned address can cause programs to crash. Even at time 
TC, when the NOP sequence is finished, this EPC will still be 
misaligned, causing a false positive. With QED constraints 
(Section III.B), we do not get such a false positive because the 
exception handling routine will be filled by valid QED tests. 
Hence, any time we assert a QED check, it will not fail unless 
there is a bug in the design. 
B.  Existing Pre-silicon Verification methods for HTs 
Existing HT detection techniques that can be applied in pre-
silicon verification broadly belong to two categories: i) design 
analysis methods; and ii) formal methods [30]. One class of 
design analysis techniques use the observation that signals 
associated with HTs may be mostly unused or rare. [5, 31-33] 
use simulation data along with rareness metrics (e.g., code 
coverage, signal correlation). [34, 35] do not need simulation 
data, but still trade off false-positives (i.e., spurious detection of 
HTs) for false-negatives (i.e., failure to detect HTs) and vice-
versa, depending on the thresholds set for their rareness metrics. 
Additionally, stealthy HTs have been designed [11] to bypass 
such analyses. In contrast to that, our technique does not require 
simulation data, detects stealthy HTs given in [11, 36-37], and 
does not produce any false positives. However, our technique is 
for processor cores, while the aforementioned analysis 
techniques are applicable to general designs. 
Formal methods for finding HTs generally either use BMC 
[12, 46], SAT-based equivalence checking [13, 38-39] or   
Table 5. HT Attack(s) implemented in other works 
Reference Trigger(s) from Table A.2.a IP Block(s) Infected 
[50] a.3 FHT, PID Controller, FPU, PRNG, R-S Decoder 
[51] a.1 (N=3, M1=32) AES-128 
[52] a.3 (M2=4); a.3 (M2=128) 4-bit ALU, AES-128 
[53] a.1 (N=12, M1=11); a.1 (N=14, M1=42) 8051 Microcontroller, UART interface 
[54] a.1 (N=3, M1=4) ISCAS-89 benchmarks 
[38] a.4 (X2=10) ISCAS-89 benchmarks 
[55] a.3 (M2=4) ISCAS-89 benchmarks 
[56] a.3 (M2=64) RS232 
[57] a.3 (M2=16-128) AES-128 
[58] a.3 (M2=1) RSA 
[59] (No Trojans inserted) DES core 
[60] a.3 (M2=16); a.3 (M2=128); a.4 (X2=128) DES; AES 
[61] a.2 (X1=32); a.3 (M2=8); a.1 (N=4, M1=8) RS232 
[31] a.3 (M2=16); a.3 (M2=9); a.4 (X2=7) ISCAS benchmarks, AES, RS232 
[62] a.3 (M2=2); a.3 (M2=4) ISCAS-85 and ISCAS-89 benchmarks 
[63] a.1 (N=4, M1=2); a.1 (N=4, M1=2) ISCAS-85 and ISCAS-89 benchmarks 
[64] (TrustHub and DeTrust HTs) RS232, AES, Wishbone, BasicRSA 
[48] a.2 (No explicit designs) AES-128 
[65] a.3 (M2=36); a.1 (N=2, M1=2); a.3 (M2=6) RS232, ISCAS benchmarks, VGA_LCD 
[66] a.3 (M2=6) Elliptic Curve Crypto Core 
[43] a.3 (M2=4) 8-bit Adder, UART 
[67] a.1 (N=2,4,8, M1=2,4,8) AXI4, APB 
[68] a.3 (No explicit designs) AES-128 
[40] (No explicit designs) 8051 Microcontroller, RC5 
[69] a.1–a.4 (all TrustHub HTs) All TrustHub benchmarks 
[70] a.1–a.4 (characterizes TrustHub) All TrustHub benchmarks 
[71] a.1–a.4 (TrustHub, DeTrust), a.2  All TrustHub, DeTrust, XOR-LFSR (special case of a.2) 
[32] (No explicit designs) Leon3 
[72] a.3 (M2=1) Sense-Amplifier 
[44] a.1-a.3 (11 TrustHub HTs) AES, RSA 
[73] a.3 (M2=32) 16-bit Multiplier, 32-bit RSA (both within ARM SoC) 
[74] a.3 (12 HTs of various size) ISCAS-85 benchmarks 
[75] a.3 (8 HTs of various size) Alpha encryption module on Spartan-3 FPGA 
[45] a.1-a.4 (TrustHub HTs) DES encryption core 
[41] a.1-a.4 (TrustHub HTs) 8051 Microcontroller 
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[76] a.1-a.4 (TrustHub HTs) DES encryption core 
[77] a.1-a.3 (7 HTs) ISCAS-85 benchmarks 
[78] a.3 (M2=67,72,152,200)  Two OpenSPARC SRAM modules, Two custom SRAMs 
[2] a.1-a.3 Leon3 
[79] a.1 (N=1, M1 not given) UART module 
[80] a.3 (M2=16) Virtex-7 FPGA LUT 
[81] a.3 (M2=2) – generated by two LFSRs DSP core on Virtex-7 FPGA 
[82] a.2, a.4 64-core SoC on Virtex-7 FPGA 
[83] a.1 (N=1,128,1024,8192, 
M1=4,8,32,64,128) 
AES-128 
[84] a.2 (X1=8); 8-LED Marquee Circuit on Spartan-3 FPGA 
[85] a.1 (N=5, M1=32) LEON2 Processor 
[42] No HT implemented Register File Copy Circuit 
[86] a.1-a.4 discussed, but not constructed 32-bit DLX processor 
[87] a.1 (N=30, M1=1) Chameleon Cryptography Core 
[88] a.1 (N=4, 16, 64, M1≤128) ISCAS-89 benchmarks, AES, DCT 
[12] a.1 (N=4, M1=16); a.1 (N=100, M1=4); a.3 
(M2=4); a.3 (M2=128); a.1 (N=4, M1=128) 
8051 Microcontroller, OpenRISC 1200, AES-128 
[46] a.1 (N=4, M1=128); a.2 (X1=128);  
a.3 (M2=128) 
AES, RSA 
[89] a.3 (M2=16) Memory controller for 16-bit addressable memory 
[90] a.1 (N=16, M1=128), TrustHub HTs Binary Sequence Detector, ISCAS-89, RS232 
[13] a.1-a.4 (TrustHub HTs) RS232, Wishbone Interconnect, PIC 8-bit, ISCAS-89  
[37] a.3 (M2=16) Ethernet MAC 10G circuit 
[91] a.1-a.4 (19 TrustHub HTs) TrustHub benchmarks 
[49] a.3 ISCAS-85 benchmarks 
[92] a.1 (No explicit construction) Attack on processor data memory 
[93] a.3 (No details given) MPEG and 5 DSP accelerators (C programs) 
[94] a.3 (M2=1) 11 Different Arithmetic, DSP cores (C-code accelerators) 
[95] a.3 (M2=1) IIR Filter Accelerator (C program) 
[96] a.3 (M2=64); (4 HTs) Ethernet MAC 10G circuit 
[97] a.1-a.4 (details not given; 7 HTs) TEA encryption on FPGA 
[39] a.1-a.4 (details not given; 37 HTs) ITC-99 benchmarks (slightly modified) 
[98] (No explicit designs given) ISCAS-85 and ISCAS-89 benchmarks 
[99] a.3 (M2 arbitrary) Leon3 
[100] a.1–a.4 (9 HTs) RS232 serial interface 
[101] a.3 (M2=64); a.3 (M2=32) DES, XTEA, CA PRNG 
[102] a.1; a.3(M2=32); a.3(M2=10) Sobel filter, AES, UART (C-code accelerators) 
[103] a.1; a.2 OpenSPARC T2 
[104] a.1; a.2; a.3 OpenSPARC T2 
[34] (TrustHub HTs) TrustHub benchmark circuits 
[105] a.1; a.2 (no explicit designs given) 4-bit adder circuit 
[106] a.1 (N=3, M1=16); 10 HTs 8051 Microcontroller 
[107] a.3 (single extra inverter, 8 HTs) ISCAS-89 benchmarks, SoC (32-bit DLX core, AES, FFT) 
[108] a.3 (single extra gate, 10 HTs) ISCAS-85, ISCAS-89 and ITC-99 benchmarks 
[109] a.3 (single extra gate, 10 HTs) ISCAS-85, ISCAS-89, and ITC-99 benchmarks 
[110] a.3 (single extra gate, 10 HTs) ISCAS-85, ISCAS-89, and ITC-99 benchmarks 
[35] a.1–a.3 OpenRISC 1200, Wishbone, Basic RSA, AES, ISCAS-89 
[5] a.1–a.4 RS232 
[36] a.1–a.4 8051 Microcontroller, OpenRISC 1200, RS232 
[11] a.1 (N=3, M1=4) OpenRISC 1200, Wishbone interconnect, ISCAS-89 
[111] a.1–a.4 (20 TrustHub HTs) OpenRISC 1200, LEON3, RS232, ISCAS benchmarks 
[112] a.3 (M2=128) AES-128 
[113] a.2 (X1=3); a.2 (X1=5) 8-bit ALU, 16-bit SEC-DED decoder 
[114] a.3 (M2=16) iCE40 FPGA 
[115] a.3 (M2=1) Turbo Decoder 
[116] (TrustHub HTs) AES, RS232, RSA 
[117] a.3 (Details not sufficient) ReLU Hardware Block 
[118] a.3 (M2=2) ISCAS-89 
[119] (TrustHub HTs) RS232, Other TrustHub 
[120] TrustHub HTs, a.2 OpenSPARC T1 
[121] a.3 (M2=2) Synchronous FIFO (8-bit, 16-depth) 
[122] a.3 (M2=7) AES-128 
[123] a.1 (N=5, M1=3) TRNG (15-bit) 
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theorem proving [40-42]. These techniques face similar 
challenges to BMC-based techniques for logic bug detection, in 
addition to manual creation of properties. 
Complementary approaches to ours include techniques to 
detect HTs that leak sensitive data, but do not produce incorrect 
logic values [43-46], and HT prevention methods [47-49]. 
C. Literature Survey of Implemented HT Attacks 
To confirm that our list of HTs (Appendix A; Table A.2.a-b)  
is representative, we surveyed over 140 different papers which 
categorize and/or construct example HTs for experimental 
evaluation. All HT constructions are shown in Table 5 (with 
parameters given, if noted explicitly in the paper). Many of the 
papers use a large subset of the TrustHub [37], DeTrust [11], or 
[152] benchmarks. All of these benchmarks are covered by HT 
activation criteria from Table A.2.a. Additional papers [153-
175] not included in Table 5 are surveys or papers that describe 
attacks in words. We confirmed that there are no HT attack 
types in [153-175] that we do not encompass. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we extended Symbolic QED to include 
symbolic starting states. As a result, we overcome limitations 
of existing pre-silicon verification techniques for detecting 
logic bugs and HTs that require long activation sequences. The 
unique combination of Symbolic QED and QED constraints 
enable us to achieve this objective. Our results on multiple 
open-source RISC-V processor cores demonstrate the 
effectiveness and practicality of our approach: i) detection of 
previously unknown logic bugs within minutes; ii) detection of 
100% of hundreds of long logic bugs and HTs (SQED with a 
concrete starting state detects, at best, 33%); iii) detection of 
97.9% of “extremal” logic bugs (SQED with a concrete starting 
state detects 0%). Future research directions include: i) 
extending our approach to detect bugs and HTs in other SoC 
components beyond processor cores, such as uncore 
components and accelerators; ii) handling other QED 
transformations beyond EDDI-V, e.g., CFTSS-V and CFCSS-
V [6]; iii) automated methods for inserting QED recorders and 
generating QED constraints on the symbolic starting state; iv) 
theoretical comparison of the bug detection capabilities of [6], 
[14], and the method of this paper; v) extension to bug and HT 
detection [176] for transistor-level analog circuits [177]. 
APPENDIX A:  LOGIC BUG AND HARDWARE TROJAN TYPES 
In the following tables, we give the different logic bug 
(harder versions of “difficult” bugs that occurred in various 
commercial designs [6]) and HT scenarios (from research 
literature) used in Table 3 of Section IV. Each “long” logic bug 
is modeled with two parts: i) activation criteria of the bug 
(Table A.1.a), i.e., the conditions which need to be satisfied for 
the bug to activate; and ii) effect of the bug once it is activated 
(Table A.1.b). For our experiments, we considered a whole 
range of values for the parameters in Table A.1, as follows, 
N=Y={2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256}, R=X={2, 4, 6, … , 30}. 
This results in a total of 117 logic bugs in Vscale (A.1.a.5 is not 
possible), and 120 logic bugs in RIDECORE. 
Table A.2.a gives HT activation types used in Table 3 of 
Section IV. Table A.2.b gives various effects an HT can have 
on the executing instructions [2]. Table A.2.c presents three HT 
implementation techniques used to inject HTs in designs [12]. 
We create stealthy HTs that are known to evade common 
detection techniques (e.g., HT designs from [36] evade 
detection techniques based on UCI [32] and coverage metrics 
[5, 32]). A HT scenario is formed by using one activation 
criteria (Table A.2.a) with one bug effect (Table A.2.b), along 
  
[124] a.2 Zynq FPGA 
[125] (TrustHub HTs) AES, DES, SHA 
[126] (TrustHub HTs) AES 
[127] a.1 (N=2, M1=11) AXI Interconnect Bus 
[128] a.1 (N=32, M1=4096) AES-256 accelerator (on FPGA) in USB Drive 
[129] a.4 TrustHub benchmark circuits 
[130] a.1 (N=4000, M1=8) NVM with 8-bit address 
[131] a.3 (M2=4) AES, OpenRISC1200 
[132], [133] a.1; a.3 SystemC Accelerators (ADPCM, AES, Bubble Sort, FIR, 
Decimation, Interpolation, UART) 
[134] a.2 (X1=4,8,12) AES-128 
[135] a.3 (M2=8) ISCAS-85 benchmarks 
[136] (TrustHub HTs) 4 Processor Cores, FIR, ADPCM, CRC, MatMul 
[137] a.3 (M2=2) NVM bit-cell 
[138] (TrustHub HTs) AES-128 
[139] a.1 (N=3, M1=32) HLS-FPGA 
[140] a.1(N=4, M1=128); a.3 (M2=128);  
a.4 (X2=128) 
AES-128 
[141] a.4 ISCAS-89 benchmark on Virtex-II FPGA 
[142] a.3 (M2=72) NoC with ARM Core 
[143] a.4 (X2=5) 8080 CPU, RISC-V CPU, MIPS CPU, AES, RC5 
[144] a.3 (M2=6) Wi-Fi FEC (Viterbi) decoder 
[145] (TrustHub HTs) Spartan FPGA 
[146] a.3 (M2=3) ISCAC-85 C17, Carry-save adder 
[147] a.3 (M2=40) NoC on FPGA 
[148] (TrustHub HTs) TrustHub benchmark circuits 
[149] a.3 (M2=4) ISCAS-89 benchmarks 
[150] a.1(N<210); a.3(M2<180); a.4 (X2<58) ISCAS-89 benchmarks, UART, AES 
[151] a.1(N=8, M1=64) Neural Network Accelerator 
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with an appropriate design strategy (Table A.2.c). We used a 
wide range of HT scenario parameters, given in Table A.2: 
N={2, 4, 8, … , 256}, M1=32, X1=X2={128, 256}, M2=64, 
resulting in 156 HT scenarios in Vscale (effect A.2.b.5 is not 
possible) and 195 HT scenarios in RIDECORE. These values 
make HTs harder to activate than benchmark HTs in [37]. 
Logic bugs and HTs were injected by introducing a small 
state machine into the design that checks for the activation 
criteria, and flips bits at targetted wires to achieve the effect. 
Table A.1.a. Activation criteria for “long” logic bugs. 
Processor 
Core  
1. Data forwarding between pipeline stages. 
2. Two specific instructions within X cycles. 
3. R registers must all contain value V. 
4. A specific sequence of N instructions must 
execute within Y cycles. 
5. A specific cache state. 
Table A.1.b. Bug effect from [6]. 
Processor 
Core  
1. Next instruction corrupted to NOP. 
2. Next instruction opcode incorrectly decoded. 
3. Next instruction register read corrupted. 
Table A.2.a. Activation criteria for HTs. 
Processor 
Core  
1. Specific length N sequence on M1 internal 
wires. 
2. X1 bit counter reaching final value. 
3. Comparator on M2 internal wires becomes 
true. 
4. X2 bit rare event counter reaches a specific 
value. 
Table A.2.b. HT effects. 
 
 
Processor 
Core  
1. An in-flight instruction changed to NOP. 
2. Opcode of an in-flight instruction changed. 
3. Next register read corrupted. 
4. Next result of an execution unit changed. 
5.Corrupts ROB. Prematurely commits next inst. 
Table A.2.c. HT design techniques. 
Method HT stealthy against following techniques  
[37] Traditional pre-silicon verification. 
[36] UCI [32]; coverage metrics [5, 32]. 
[11] [5, 32, 33, 34]. 
APPENDIX B:  PROOFS 
In this Appendix, we formalize our assumptions on how any 
bug-free design should operate. We relate these assumptions to 
Section III.B, and prove Theorem 1.  
We first provide preliminary definitions [178]. We will use 
the term alphabet to refer to a nonempty set of symbols. We 
will often be dealing with operations on words (sequences of 
symbols from countable alphabets). We will denote the empty 
word as 𝜀, and the empty set as ∅. For finite vectors of equal 
length, 𝐱 = (x4,… , xU) and 𝐲 = (y4,… , yU), we write Δ(𝐱, 𝐲) for 
the subset of indices they differ on. For example, Δ((9,0), (7,0)) 
= {1}, and Δ((1,0), (1,0))	= ∅. 
The next definition provides the model of computation used 
in our statements. 
Definition 1 (Transition System). A tuple 𝕋 = 〈𝒮, 𝒮_, 𝕀,𝒯, ℱ〉 is 
called a transition system if 
• 𝒮 is a countable alphabet of states. 
• 𝒮_ ⊆ 𝒮 is the nonempty subset of initial states.   
• 𝕀 is a nonempty, finite set of actions. 
• 𝒯 ⊆ 𝒮 × 	𝕀 × 𝒮 is the transition relation. 
• ℱ ⊆ 𝒮 is the nonempty subset of accept states. 
Each transition system has an associated specification function 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐:	𝒮 × 𝕀 → 𝒮, where 𝑠4 = 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑠_, 𝐼) ⟺ 〈𝑠_, 𝐼, 𝑠4〉 ∈ 𝒯. 
The state-space 𝒮 contains all states that can be represented 
by the transition system. 𝒮_ is the set of starting states that the 
transition system can begin in for any execution. 𝕀 is a set of 
actions that can be applied to steer the system from one state to 
the next. 𝒯 is the transition relation, a countable set which 
represents the mapping that each action implements. ℱ is a set 
of accept states, in which executions can end.  
If 𝒮 is finite, and |𝒮_|=1 (i.e., there is only one possible starting 
state), the system is called a finite-state machine [179]. The next 
definition describes finite sequences of actions, and the states 
they allow a system to traverse. 
Definition 2 (Path). A path or trace of length K in a transition 
system 𝕋 = 〈𝒮, 𝒮_, 𝕀,𝒯, ℱ〉 is a pair .𝑠_, {𝐼n}no4p /, where 
i.   𝑠_ ∈ 𝒮_ is an initial state. 
ii.  {𝐼n}no4p  is an action sequence, where 𝐼n ∈ 𝕀, for 1 ≤ i ≤ K. 
iii.	〈𝑠n, 𝐼ns4, 𝑠ns4〉 ∈ 𝒯, for 0 ≤ i ≤ K − 1.      
A path may also be denoted explicitly by the sequence of 
states traversed as   𝑠_ tu→ 𝑠4 tv→⋯txyuz⎯|𝑠p}4 tx→𝑠p. 
For any processor core, we assume there exists a transition 
system model (with finite state-space, but not restricted to a 
single starting state) that defines the behavior of the system. We 
call this transition system the ISA (e.g., [180, 181]) of the core. 
The actions in an ISA are called instructions. This concept is 
formalized in the next definition.  
Definition 3 (ISA). A transition system 𝕋 = 〈𝒮, 𝒮_, 𝕀, 𝒯, ℱ〉 
with finite state-space	𝒮 is called an ISA with	N ≥ 1 original 
registers and Q ≥ 1 original memory locations if 
i. 𝒮 = .R4,… , R@U,M4,… ,M@,𝐙/ is the state space. 
ii. .R4,… , R@U,M4,… ,M@/ is called architectural state. 
iii. 𝐙 is the internal state. 
iv. R4,… , RU are original registers. RUs4,… , R@U are 
duplicate registers. Registers can take any value from a 
finite alphabet, ℛ.  
v. M4,… ,M are original memory and Ms4,… ,M@ are 
duplicate memory.  Memories can take any value from a 
finite alphabet, ℳ. 
vi. Each instruction I ∈ 𝕀, has a set of source operands, and 
a set of destination operands. 
vii. R is a source operand of I ∈ 𝕀 iff. ∃	s_, s4 ∈ 𝒮, with 
corresponding architectural states a_,	a4 st.,  𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(s_, I) ≠ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(s4, I), and  Δ(a_, a4) = {k}. 
 Likewise, M is a source operand of I ∈ 𝕀 iff. ∃	s_, s4 ∈ 𝒮, 
with corresponding architectural states a_,	a4 st., 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(s_, I) ≠ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(s4, I), and Δ(a_, a4) = {2N+ j}. 
viii. A register or memory location is a destination operand 
for I ∈ 𝕀 if there exists 〈𝑠_, I, 𝑠4〉 ∈ 𝒯 such that 𝑠_ and 𝑠4 
differ at the corresponding index.    
Instructions having only original registers and memory as 
both source and destination operands are called original 
instructions. Likewise, instructions using only duplicate 
registers and memory as operands are called duplicate 
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instructions. An instruction is considered a NOP if the set of all 
source and destination operands is ∅.  
Note, there is no loss of generality in this hard-coding of the 
architectural state indices. We can always define two 
permutations, σ and µ on [1, … ,2N] and [1, … ,2Q] respectively, 
s.t. 𝒮 = .R(4),… , R(@U),M(4), … ,M(@), 𝐙/. 
Definition 3 is general enough to handle instructions with 
multiple destination operands. So, superscalar cores which  
commit multiple instructions per cycle are still covered.  
Now we prove Theorem 1 of Section III.B.  
Proof of Theorem 1: Let .𝑠_, {Jn}no4p / be a bug trace obtained 
from SQED with symbolic starting states, denoted as: 𝑠_ u→ 𝑠4 v→⋯z| 𝑠 uz|⋯z|𝑠p. 
Here, {Jn}no4  are the symbolic in-flight instructions and 𝑠 is 
a QED-consistent state (see Constraint C-2). Without loss of 
generality, assume the original, duplicate register and memory 
pairs for EDDI-V are chosen as (Rn,RnsU), for 1 ≤ i ≤ N and 
(M,Ms), for 1 ≤ j ≤ Q. 
 Let {On}no4  be the subsequence of original instructions and {Dn}no4  be the subsequence of duplicate instructions in the 
failing EDDI-V test. Indexing in the subsequences corresponds 
to the order in which instructions commit to architectural state. 
Without loss of generality, assume the failed EDDI-V test is 
due to mismatched values in two registers (Rn,RnsU), as opposed 
to memory. Let 𝑣𝑎𝑙(s,Rn) denote the value held by register Rn in 
state s. Because 𝑠 is QED-consistent,  𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠,Rn) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠,RnsU). 
Further, it must be true that ∃a ∈ {1,… , n}	st. .𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢£,Rn) ≠ 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤£,RnsU)/ ∧ .⋀ 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢§,Rn) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤§,RnsU)¨∈{4,…,*}4} 	/,           (1) 
where T* is the time where O* writes (commits) to destination 
operand Rn and T* is the time where D* writes to destination 
operand RnsU. Explicitly, (O*,D*) is the first pair of SQED 
instructions that force these two architectural state elements to 
be QED inconsistent. Equation (1) is true because there must 
exist some Symbolic QED instructions which write to the pair Rn, RnsU such that the QED check fails on 𝑠p, as Constraint C-1 
ensures that all SIF instructions complete by TM.  
We can partially represent instructions O* and D* as below: 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢£,Rn) = op(x4,x@,… , xª) 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤£,RnsU) = op(	x4« , x@« ,… , xª« ). 
Here, op is a function performed on data stored in source 
operands x4,… , xª, and each instruction writes a computed 
result to its destination operand. Because O*,D* are a pair of 
EDDI-V instructions, they implement the same function on the 
source operands.  
When O* and D* execute, only one of two conditions are 
satisfied:  
(A) ∀j ∈ {1,… ,m},					𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢£}4, x) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤£}4, x«). 
    (B)	∃j ∈ {1,… ,m}	st. 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢£}4, x) ≠ 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤£}4, x«). 
First, assume (A) holds. Then all source operand data of O* 
and D* match: 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢£,Rn) = op(data4,data@,… , dataª)	𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤£,RnsU) = op(data4, data@,… , dataª).	
However, we must have 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢£,Rn) ≠ 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤£,RnsU) 
because an EDDI-V test failed. This implies that the same 
operation (op) performed on the same data results in two 
different values when executed twice, contradicting 
Assumption-1 of any bug-free design. Therefore, for case (A), 
Theorem 1 holds. 
Next, assume (B) holds instead of (A). We have five mutually 
disjoint subcases for (B), depending on when the operands’ data 
are available for the instructions to compute on (for each 
subcase, we show that Theorem 1 holds): 
(B.1) At TC, data for both operands x and x« is available. 
As Constraint C-3 (i) holds, 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠, x) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢£}4,x), and 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠, x«) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤£}4, x«). From Constraint C-2, 𝑠 is also 
QED-consistent. Therefore, by transitivity of equality, 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢£}4, x) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤£}4, x«). This contradicts the assumption 
of (B). Thus, (B.1) cannot arise when QED constraints hold. 
(B.2) At TC, data for only one operand (pick x without loss of 
generality) is available. 
If (B.2) holds, only one of the following two cases can arise: 
(B.2.1) There are no earlier (before D*) SQED instructions 
writing to x«; or (B.2.2) There is at least one earlier SQED 
instruction upon which D* has RAW dependency for source 
operand x«.  
Assume case (B.2.1). From Constraints C-3 (i) and C-2, 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠, x) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢£}4, x) and 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠, x) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠, x«). If 
Assumption-2 holds, 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤£}4, x«) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠, x«), which 
implies by transitivity of equality that 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢£}4, x) =𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤£}4, x«). However, this contradicts the assumption of (B). 
Thus, for case (B.2.1), if an EDDI-V test fails, it is caused by a 
bug in the design.  
Now assume that (B.2.2) holds instead of (B.2.1). Let D, be 
the last instruction that D* has RAW dependency on for source 
operand x«. From Assumption-2, 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤¯, x«) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤£}4, x«). 
Let O, be the corresponding original instruction for D,. Note 
that O* also has an equivalent RAW dependency upon O,. 
Therefore, from Assumption-2 we again have 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢¯, x) =𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢£}4, x). We also have from equation (1), 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢¯, x) =𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤¯, x«). Hence, by transitivity of equality, 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢£}4, x) =𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤£}4, x«). However, this contradicts the assumption of (B), 
Thus, for case (B.2.2), if an EDDI-V test fails, it is caused by a 
bug in the design.  
(B.3) At TM, data for both operands x and x« are not available. 
If case (B.3) holds, only one of two cases can arise: (B.3.1) 
There is no earlier (before O*, D*)  SQED instruction pair that 
write to x, x«; (B.3.2) There is an earlier SQED instruction pair O,, D, that write to x, x«  that is the last pair O*, D* have RAW 
dependencies on for these operands.  
Next, assume that (B.3.1) holds. From Assumption-2, 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠, x) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢£}4, x) and 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠, x«) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤£}4, x«). 
From Constraint C-2, 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠, x) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠, x«). Thus, by 
transitivity of equality, 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢£}4, x) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤£}4, x«). This 
contradicts (B). Hence, in case (B.3.1) we also conclude that if 
an EDDI-V test fails, it is caused by a bug in the design.  
Finally, assume that (B.3.2) holds. From Assumption-2, 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢¯, x) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢£}4, x) and 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤¯, x«) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤£}4, x«). 
From Eqn. (1), 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢¯, x) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤¯,x«), and then by 
transitivity, 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¢£}4, x) = 𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑠¤£}4, x«). This contradicts 
(B). Thus, for case (B.3.2), we also conclude that if an EDDI-V 
test fails, it is caused by a bug in the design.  
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We have shown that in each of the six possible mutually 
disjoint cases, an EDDI-V test failure can only be caused by a 
bug in the design. This proves Theorem 1.              ∎ 
APPENDIX C:  SPECIFYING QED CONSTRAINTS DURING BMC 
In this Appendix, we describe in detail how we specify the 
QED constraints (see Section III.B) to the BMC tool.  
Specifying C-1. Constraint C-1 is naturally satisfied in 
processors with in-order execution, which is the case for 
processors with in-order pipelines. But, this is not the case with 
OoO cores. This is due to instruction indirection, i.e., renaming 
of instructions using respective ROB entries to support OoO 
execution. When starting at a symbolic state, ROB entry 
locations for SIF instructions may be chosen by the BMC tool 
such that SIF instructions commit after QED instructions, 
thereby violating C-1. So, specifying C-1 just requires 
constraining ROB entries for SIF instructions to avoid the issue.  
Specifying C-2. Constraint C-2 requires that test modes such 
as scan which can bypass instructions and write directly to the 
architectural state need to be turned off at TC (otherwise, 
spurious counterexamples can occur). Assuming there is a Test)*¨°) signal to turn on/off each scan or other test mode, we 
can specify C-2 using the TC recorder (Fig. 5) and the below: ↑ .SIF³ª´°)µ)/ ⇒ ∀(i, j) ∈ Λ·, .Rn == R/, ↑ .SIF³ª´°)µ)/ ⇒ ∀(m,n) ∈ Λ¸, (Mª == M), ↑ (Clock) ⇒ if	.SIF³ª´°)µ)/, Test)*¨°) == 	0. 
Above, ↑ (Signal*ª)) is true on any clock edge where Signal*ª) transitions from low to high; Λ· is the set of all 
mapped (original, duplicate) pairs of registers; Rn is the value 
held in register i; Λ¸ is the set of all mapped (original, duplicate) 
pairs of memory locations; and Mª is the value held in memory 
location m. For the experiments in Section IV, these statements 
were specified in the form of System-Verilog assume 
statements. Note that these constraints take the same form for 
both in-order and OoO cores. 
Specifying C-3. Constraint C-3(ii) is vacuously true for in-
order pipelines, as an instruction only makes progress when all 
its operands have already read their respective data. Otherwise, 
the instruction just stalls for operand data. We use the TC (Fig. 
5) and SQED operand (Fig. 6) recorders to specify C-3(i): ↑ .SIF³ª´°)µ)/ ⇒ ∀s ∈ src1_buffer	(s. data == R¿.*++(),	↑ .SIF³ª´°)µ)/ ⇒ ∀s ∈ src2_buffer	(s. data == R¿.*++(),	↑ .SIF³ª´°)µ)/ ⇒ ∀m ∈ mem_buffer	(m.data == Mª.*++(). 
Above, s.data gives the data stored for entry s in the buffer 
and s.addr gives the address. Rn is the value held in register i; 
and Mª is the value held in memory location m. For an OoO 
core, specifying C-3(i) is the same as above, but also checks 
additional ROB data in the Symbolic QED operand recorder 
(see Section III.C). 
Finding Counterexamples Using BMC. The property (see 
Section II.B) used by BMC to find counter-examples in 
Symbolic QED is modified, using the TC recorder (Fig. 5) to 
support symbolic starting states: ↑ .QED()*+,	&&	SIF³ª´°)µ)/ ⇒ 1 Ra == Ra′*∈{4,…,U}  
Here, the only change is the addition of the SIF³ª´°)µ) pre-
condition to the QED property. 
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